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Davidson, non-ergodicity and
individuals
John B. Davis

The distinctiveness of post Keynesian economic theory from both neoclassical and neoRicardian economic theory rests in large degree on the former's
emphasis on fundamental uncertainty. Paul Davidson has emphasized this
difference time and again, arguing that Keynes 's own thinking was most
revolutionary in its attention to uncertainty, especially in regard to the analysis of liquidity and the properties of a monetary production economy. Partly
in response to this insight, a 'fundamentalist Keynesianism' has developed in
recent years that traces Keynes 's understanding of uncertainty to his early
Treatise on Probability account of probability in terms of degrees of belief
(for example, Carabelli, 1988; O' Donnell, 1989). However, Davidson's treatment of uncertainty is explicitly rooted in a rejection of the idea that reality is
an ergodic system, that is, an immutable, unchanging set of processes that
eternally replicate past patterns of events. In his view, the world is nonergodic, because important aspects of the future are created by human action.
Thus though there is an epistemological dimension to his discussio ns of
uncertainty that is not incompatible with an explanation of expectations in
terms of degrees of belief, it is important to recognize that the idea that
economic reality is non-ergodic is not an epistemological one, but rather an
ontological one. Even more important for Davidson's understanding of uncertainty is the priority of this ontological claim over any epistemological
claims regarding limitations on human information processing. Simon's
bounded rationality conception, for example, .looked at in purely epistemological terms involves what appears to be a rather fundamental sort of uncertainty. However, in Davidson's view, that Simon supposes the world is ergodic
makes his conception close kin to Savage's expected utility analysis, and
separates it off entirely from Keynes's more radical understanding of uncertainty (Davidson, 1995, p. 109). Uncertainty, then, cannot be understood
solely in epistemological terms, and depends in the first instance on a correct
understanding of the nature of reality itself.
To elaborate on this ontological theme, and to develop further the characteristically post Keynesian conception of uncertainty, this chapter sets forth
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an account of the functioning of a non-ergodic economic world in terms of
the behaviour of individuals operating both within and upon conventions and
institutions. In a non-ergodic world, according to Davidson, individual economic agents make choices on the assumption that the world is transmutable.
They also, he emphasizes, rely upon conventions and institutions to stabilize
and improve patterns of outcomes. Yet if the future is transformed in important respects as a result of human action, we must allow, first, that conventions and institutions may themselves be transformed - intentionally and
unintentionally - by human action, and, second, that the transformation of
conventions and institutions may in turn serve to transform the basis on
which individuals themselves subsequently act as economic agents. In this
non-ergodic picture of reciprocal influences of social structures and individual agency upon one another, post Keynesians have emphasized how
conventions and institutions influence the behaviour of individuals, in part as
a corrective to neoclassicism's atomistic individualism. Left largely
unexamined, however, is how the theory of the individual economic agent
needs to be re-developed, both to complete the picture of the economic
process as non-ergodic, and to replace the static, ergodic view of individuals
as atomistic agents in neoclassical economic theory.
Thus this chapter seeks to develop along Davidsonian lines Keynes's own
General Theory account of the nature of individuals, linking it to Keynes 's
account of conventions, in order to better describe the nature of uncertainty in
a non-ergodic world. The first section of the chapter begins with a brief
summary of Davidson's recent thinking on non-ergodicity, in order to draw
out the implications of his ontological view of uncertainty. An important
aspect of this view is the idea that individuals operate both within and upon
conventions and other institutional structures. The second section of the
chapter then examines critically neoclassical thinking about the nature of
individuals, in order to set the stage for discussion of the understanding of
individuals to be found in Keynes's thinking. Though neoclassicism is methodologically individualist, ironically its account of the nature of the individual can be shown to be seriously flawed in two important respects. The
third section of the chapter examines Keynes's views on the nature of individuals in two locations in The General Theory, and then turns to one post
Keynesian interpretation of the nature of the relations between individuals.
An important argument of the chapter that appears in this section is that
Keynes did not reason in terms of organic connection. The fourth and final
section of the chapter makes concluding remarks about Keynesian uncertainty in connection with individuals and conventions.
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DAVIDSON ON NON-ERGODICITY
On an ergodic view of the world, reality is immutable and unchanging in the
sense that the basic causal relations governing the world never change and
always hold in all circumstances. Though we observe variation at the level of
events, individuals, and particular practices, the principal cause-and-effect
relationships underlying their variety and flux are themselves understood to
be constant and unchanging. That is, just as in natural science the law of
gravity always holds, so in economics and social science behaviour is always
explained in terms of essentially the same causal relationships, irrespective of
changing social conditions and historical development. Thus economics is
the study of a single set of underlying relationships. And, as there can never
be new relationships and new cause-and-effect patterns generated by changing historical circumstances, economists are able to continually refine and
build upon earlier insights, so that economic knowledge may be represented
as always involving cumulative advance and progress.
Davidson identifies one such purported advance as twentieth-century methods for modelling of economic agents' informational capacities (1995).
Whereas nineteenth-century classical economists effectively assumed that
individuals operated in a world of perfect certainty, contemporary orthodox
economists assume that individuals predict future outcomes by estimating
their probabilities based on past and present market data. There are a variety
of such probabilistic approaches, ranging from new classical theories that
postulate rational expectations in the short run to New Keynesian, expected
utility, bounded rationality, and Austrian views that suppose that the future is
not completely known in the short run due to limitations in human cognitive
ability. However, all these views share what Davidson terms the 'Darwinian
story' that economic agents who fail to adapt their subjective probabilities to
the world's immutable objective probabilities do not survive (p. \07). Thus
contemporary orthodox thinkers still share with the classical economists the
idea that there is a single, determinate, unchanging economic reality. Their
' progress ' on classical economics is merely to add that economic agents may
fail in the pursuit of their objectives not only because they may make poor
economic decisions (as the classicals allowed), but also because they may fail
to forecast future conditions successfully however good their economic
decision-making.
For Key nes, on the other hand, the world is transmutable or non-ergodic in
the sense that the principles underlying the phenomena we observe are historically specific and may change with development in the economy's structure. The passing of the age of entrepreneurship and owner-led firms was an
important change in the economy's structure of organization. Consequently,
as he stressed in his critique of Tinbergen's econometric methodology,
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economic time series may often not be stationary, because the underlying
economic environment can be 'non-homogeneous through time' (Keynes, XIV,
p. 285). This is not, however, what all commentators emphasize when discussing Keynes on uncertainty. Rather they often point to statements such as
Keynes made in 1937 in his Quarterly Journal of Economics response to his
critics that regarding much of what will take place in the future, 'We simply
do not know' (Keynes, XN, p. 113). It is true, of course, that in situations of
true uncertainty decision-makers do not know enough to form reliable probability judgements regarding future events. But that they do not is first and
foremost a matter of the fact that the future will not sufficiently resemble the
past so as to permit such judgements. Were, contrary to fact, the future to
closely resemble the past, and were there still significant limitations in our
capacity to process information (as clearly there are), uncertainty could then
be modelled as behaviour under risk. What is requiredior radical uncertainty,
then, is merely the fact that the future will not be like the past in important
respects, that is, that historical data do not provide a reliable statistical basis
for drawing inferences about future outcomes (Davidson, 1991; also cf. Hicks,
1979 and Davidson , 1994). When Keynes said that we cannot even begin to
know what the future may hold, he simply meant to indicate that the future
would be different in more ways than he or anyone else could imagine.
This emphasis may strike some as unnecessary, but saying that Keynesian
uncertainty rests on the ontological proposition that the world is non-ergodic
serves an important purpose. Namely, it encourages us to ask why cause-andeffect relations underlying the phenomena we observe should be thought to
be historically specific. For Davidson , the answer is straightforward. Saying
that the world is non-ergodic is equivalent to saying that it is transmutable,
where this means the economic world may be transformed in fundamental
ways as a consequence of human agency. That is, human beings are free to
change not just the course of events (as orthodox thinkers allow), but are also
free to change the very principles governing the economic process. It is this
that produces radical Keynesian uncertainty regarding the future. We generally do not - cannot - know what the future will hold, because the future is
yet to be determined, or better, will be determined in large degree by our
actions. Uncertainty consequently cannot be treated as risk in all but the most
trivial situations, because human action continually re-determines the frequency distributions of phenomena in which we are interested .
This does not imply, Davidson emphasizes, that economic policy is powerless. True, if economic policy is conceived of as designing specific courses of
action that rely on accurate forecasts about what path the economy is likely to
take, policy is unlikely to be successful. However, if economic policy is
rather thought to have the design of institutional arrangements that tend to
mitigate the undesirable effects of human action as its chief objective, then its
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prospects are more promising. Keynes 's insight was that laissez-faire economies lack endogenous forces to drive them to full employment equilibria.
Essentially the behaviour of individuals and the framework of free market
institutions within which they operate permits series of mutually reinforcing
contractions of demand that ultimately expire below full employment
equilibria. However, different sorts of institutions may be devised that lack
this character, and which rather tend to raise demand and employment.
Keynes's call for 'a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment'
(VIII, p. 378) was meant as just the sort of institutional reform that might
accomplish this. Economic policy for Keynes and Davidson, then, aims at
institutional change designed to improve patterns of interaction between
individuals and the institutions within which they operate to achieve goals
such as low unemployment.
At the same time, however, when individuals operate upon institutions in
an effort to bring about policy goals, on a non-ergodic view of the world and
economic policy we must also suppose that their actions will be influenced
and conditioned by both the institutions they modify as well as new institutions that emerge. That is, a non-ergodic view of the world also tells us that
social structure and individual agency have reciprocal effects on one another,
so that individuals and institutions are continually evolving in relation to one
another. In contrast, neoclassical economists suppose that the underlying
principles operating in economic life are stable and unchanging, and thus
generally also suppose that the nature of individuals and institutions in which
they operate is set and unchanging. New Institutionalists do allow that institutions evolve, but still maintain that individuals are unchanging in nature, so
that the institutional environment adapts to human action, but not the reverse.
This suggests that on a non-ergodic view of individuals and institutions we
ought to be able to demonstrate that in an historical economic process individuals are transformed along with institutions. Demonstrating this requires
developing a new understanding of the individual alternative to that employed in neoclassicism - the subject taken up in section three below. Before
turning to that task, the following section accordingly attempts to diagnose
the problems inherent in the neoclassical conception of the individual to
create guidelines for a better account.

THE NEOCLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL
Two problems are diagnosed here: one concerning the standard characterization of individuals as collections of preferences, and the other concerning
how individuals relate to social context.
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(i) Neoclassical economic theory assumes individuals are unchanging in
nature. This implies that across any set of changes in an individual's environment, the theory must successfully demonstrate that any given individual
remains in essence the selfsame individual. Alternatively, central to any conception of individuals as unchanging in nature is an account of what makes
any individual consistently distinct from all other individuals. On the neoclassical view, of course, individuals are distinguished as distinct collections
of preferences. But can this conception of the individual successfully distinguish individuals as distinct beings? In Davis (1995), I argued that for neoclassicism the idea of individuals having distinct collections of preferences is
equivalent to saying that individuals have their own sets of preferences. In
effect, since preferences themselves are defined entirely subjectively or only
in terms of the individuals to whom they belong, they must always be some
individual 's own preferences. But using individuals ' OWl! preferences to distinguish individuals through change is question-begging in that it presupposes the very individuals those preferences are meant to distinguish. If a set
of own preferences picks out some individual, they must naturally be that
particular individual's preferences and not someone else's preferences. But if
we have already picked out the individual to whom a set of preferences
belongs in order to call these preferences that particular individual's own
preferences, we cannot then turn around, and use those preferences as a
criterion for di stinguishing individuals from one another.
In short, neoclassical theory 's criterion for distinguishing and defining
individuals is circular and question-begging. The general problem with conceptualizing the individual as a collection of subjective preferences can be
seen from a different perspective if we ask how the view holds up when we
consider the possibility that individuals ' preferences may change. Stigler and
Becker (1977), in what has become the accepted position on the subject,
sought specifically to rule out this case, insisting that preferences do not
change. Their professed reason for doing so was entirely ad hoc in that they
simply wished to explain choice solely in terms of changes in prices and
incomes . But perhaps they were also aware that were an individual to be
distinguished in terms of one set of preferences at one point in time, and then
distinguished according to another set of preferences at another point in time,
continuity of individual identity would require there to be something more to
being an individual than just having preferences, thus demonstrating that
individuals could not be explained solely in terms of preferences. Note that
one common sense view of why preferences change is that individuals are
influenced by their environment. Adults do not have the same preferences
they had as infants, because of their subsequent experience. But this sort of
answer is incompatible with characterizing individuals solely in terms of
. their subjective preferences. The Stigler-Becker strategy can thus be seen as
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a means of closing off investigation of the inadequacy of the neoclassical
conception of the individual.
(ii) Another manifestation of the problems involved in the neoclassical
approach to explaining individuals concerns the way that the call for
micro foundations for macroeconomics tends to be addressed. For most proponents of microfoundations, the basic rationale behind the claim that macroeconomic relationships need to be grounded in microeconomic ones is that
the latter concern the behaviour of individuals, whereas the former concern
aggregative relationships based on the behaviour of groups of individuals .
Individuals are ostensibly real entities, but groups of individuals are claimed
to be mere conceptual constructions, and thus one step removed from the
real. New classical and new Keynesian economists consequently favour what
may be termed individualist-reductionist type explanations of macroeconomic relationships, supposing that good explanation is always explanation
in terms of really existing things.
However, it is doubtful that individualist-reductionist microfoundational
accounts of macroeconomic relationships can ever be successful. Not only do
such accounts require that macroeconomic relationships be explained in terms
of the behaviour of households and firms but they also require that the
choices of households and firms ultimately be explained in terms of the
choices of individuals within households and firms. This latter condition
involves an analysis of individuals' strategic interaction, the province of
game theory, where research has shown that determinate results are either
available in only the most trivial situations or depend upon our assuming that
conventions and institutions create a framework for individual interaction
(Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 1995, pp. 204ff.). In the latter case, as we
!TIust presuppose conventions and institutions in order to explain individual
choice, conventions and institutions cannot be said to be mere conceptual
constructions, but must be, like individuals, real constituents of the world.
Thus as individuals are not the on ly real things that exist, there is no reason to
think that groups of individuals are not real as well , and consequently no
special reason for an individualist-reductionism.
An alternative conception of the microfoundations project aims at reducing
macroeconomic relationships to accounts of rational optimizing behaviour
not associated with the choices of particular individuals. Representative agent
models assume that the choices of any number of diverse individuals in a
single sector of the economy can be treated as the choices of one 'representative' rational optimizing agent. What proponents of this approach might be
said to assume is that microeconomics has a better developed structure than
macroeconomics, and thus on unity of science grounds we should strive to
make the latter conform to the former (Janssen, 1993). Of course in the face
of such difficulties as the Sonnenschein- Mantel-Debreu results it is hard to
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believe that microeconomics either has a very well developed analytical
structure or one obviously superior to macroeconomics . Moreover, it is hardly
clear that the choices of representative agents coincide with aggregate choices
of heterogeneous individuals (Kirman, 1992). And finally, the unity of science goal , while commendable in the abstract, may simply not apply to subdisciplines of a subject that are fundamentally different in nature.
But more interesting for purposes of the discussion here is that proponents
of this approach to microfoundations believe that rational optimizing behaviour need not be associated with actual individuals at all. Though the analysis
was originally developed with actual individuals in mind, that the analysis
can be used without reference to individuals suggests that it is not very
closely tied to the task of characterizing real world individuals. In effect,
then , rational optimizing could be said to not be a means of distinguishing
actual individuals. This conclusion recalls the problem with individualistreductionist micro foundational explanations. There the microfoundations
project obscures the role of conventions and institutions that help to structure
bargaining between individuals. In rational optimizing-reductionist explanations, on the other hand, whether conventions and institutions underlie rational optimizing is ultimately irrelevant, because that analysis need not even
be about distinct individuals.
(iii) The two sorts of problems with the neoclassical conception of the
individual described in (i) and (ii) above may be said to be associated with
two different types of considerations involved in developing an adequate
conception of individuals . In (i), the issue is how we account for the subjectivity or subjective side of individuals. The neoclassical strategy of tying this
aspect of individuals to own preferences clearly represents an unsuccessful
way of getting at individuals' distinctiveness from one another. In (ii), the
issue is how we account for the social embedded ness of individuals, or
alternatively the issue is how we position individuals in social settings. This
might be termed the objective side of individuals. Neoclassical theory was
found wanting in this regard, in that its highly atomistic view of individuals
either compels it to ignore individuals ' social context or treat choice as
disembodied.
A post Keynesian conception of individuals consequently needs to explain
both what distinguishes individuals from one another - individuals' subjective
side - and how individuals are positioned with respect to one another in social
frameworks - individuals' social embeddedness or objective side. Moreover, it
needs to do this in an account of a non-ergodic world in which individuals
operate within and upon conventions and institutions. In the following section
we first look at two locations in The General Theory in which Keynes addressed each of the two sorts of considerations involved here, and then turn to
analysis of one post Keynesian approach to explaining individuals.
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KEYNES AND POST KEYNESIANS ON INDIVIDUALS
(i) Keynes devoted the generally overlooked, ninth chapter of The General
Theory, 'The propensity of consume: II. The subjective factors', to discussion
of the subjective side of individuals. That the chief focus of the chapter is
those 'motives or objects of a subjective character which lead individuals to
refrain from spending out of their incomes' (VII, p. 107; emphasis added)
demonstrates that Keynes was not looking upon individuals only in their
capacity as consumers. Rather, si nce he was on the whole concerned with
whether the economy's lower consumption was made up by higher investment, he was interested in the full range of motivations involved in individual
economic behaviour from the perspective of their possible impact upon the
propensity to consume. Indeed, following the list of eight motives that lead
individuals involved in consumption to refrain from spending Keynes then
appended four 'motives largely analogous to, but not identical with, those
actuating individuals' on the part of those in 'Central and Local Government
... Institutions and ... Business Corporations ' to refrain from spending.
The first eight motives are precaution, foresight, calculation, improvement,
independence, enterprise, pride and avarice. The added four motives are
enterprise, liquidity, improvement, and financial prudence (pp. 107-9). Besides compiling the list, Keynes briefly describes each motive. For example,
improvement is characterized as the motive:

To enjoy a gradually increasing expenditure, since it gratifies a common instinct
to look forward to a gradually improving standard of life rather than the contrary,
even though the capacity for enjoyment may be diminishing.
Independence is characterized as the motive:
To enjoy a sense of independence and the power to do things, though without a
clear idea or definite intention of specific action.
The four motives in the second list, in contrast, pertain directly to individuals'
own appreciation or sense of the financial concerns of government and business in which they are employed.
One reason few readers of Th e General Theory have paid much attention to
the book's ninth chapter is that what Keynes treats as objective factors determining the propensity to consume in the previous chapter are central to his
' fundamental psychological law' that individuals are disposed to increase
their consumption as their income increases, but by not as much. Indeed in a
comment upon how his subjective factors influence the propensity to consume, Keynes notes that, on account of slow change in society'S organization,
habits, capital, and distribution of wealth that form the 'main background ' to
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these subjective factors, attention can be focused upon 'short-period changes
in consumption [that) largely depend on changes in the rate at which income
. .. is being earned and not on changes in the propensity to consume out of a
given income' (pp. 109, 110). But of chief interest here is how Keynes understands individuals' subjective side.
In contrast to the neoclassical conception, Keynes's motives are not treated
as tastes entirely specific to particular individuals - thus as necessarily own
preferences - but as types of motivations all individuals possess that may be
observed in different combinations in particular individuals. To signal as much
Keynes capitalizes the name of each motive (,Precaution ... Pride ... Extravagance'), as if to imply he is referring to widely observed character traits of
individuals. The effect of this is to root the subjective side of individuals in the
language of a highly familiar psychology, while yet particularizing individuals
in terms of the specific combinations of motives they exercise. The circularity
of the neoclassical account is avoided, because the language of motivation
employed is not solely a matter of the isolated individual's mental contents.
Precaution, Pride, and so on represent psychological orientations tied to types
of circumstances in which individuals may find themselves. This implies that
individuals are distinct from one another not just according to the combinations
of motives they exhibit, but also according to the particular social-historical
settings they occupy in which these various motives are exhibited. Two layers
of content additional to what is found in the neoclassical conception of the
individual thus individuate Keynes's economic actors: that they react in ways
others may not according to the combination of motives they each exhibit, and
that their doing so is occasioned by their own particular circumstances, where
that includes the 'main background' to subjective motives in the form of social
organization, habits, distribution of wealth, and so on.
(ii) Turning from the issue of individuals' subjective side to the issue of
their social embeddedness, or how individuals are positioned with respect to
one another, we come to passages in The General Theory more familiar and
more often quoted. In Chapter Thirteen Keynes explains uncertainty as to the
future rate of interest as a foundation of liquidity preference. Recalling his
Treatise on Malley he notes that 'different people' - bulls and bears - 'will
estimate the prospects differently' (p. 169), and:
the individual , who believes that future rates of interest will be above the rates
assumed by the market, has reason for keeping actual liquid cash ... whilst the
individual who differs from the market in the other direction will have a motive
for borrowing money for short periods in order to purchase debts of longer term.
(p. 170)

That is, explaining liquidity preference, an attitude towards the importance of
holding money in an uncertain environment, requires that we understand how

Davidson, non-ergodicity and individuals

II

individuals differentiate themselves with respect to others and the prevailing
state of affairs, namely, market-determined interest rates. Relatedly, in the
preceding twelfth chapter on investment and long-term expectation, Keynes
states that speculators focus on the state of 'average expectation ' (p. 151)
regarding the worth of various investments, in order to figure out how to
'outwit the crowd' (p. 155), and do better than 'what average opinion believes
average opinion to be' (p. 159). That is, individuals again position themselves
with respect to established ways of seeing things, in order to mark out their
own course of action.
In these passages and elsewhere in The General Theory Keynes addresses
how individuals particularize themselves in institutional contexts. The contrast with neoclassical reductionist arguments is instructive. The latter aim to
fully translate social-institutional economic settings into the choices of individuals, but either end up presupposing those settings (individualistreductionism), or fail to account for the activity of individuals altogether
(rational optimizing reductionism). Keynes 's approach, on the other hand,
situates individuals in conventional and institutional frameworks from the
outset, and uses these frameworks to explain how individuals act differently
from one another. This treatment of individual action as embodied in a social
environment - rather than obscuring the place of individuals in the economic
process, as might be claimed from a neoclassical perspective - serves to
identify the specific impact and roles individuals have in concrete settings. It
constitutes a non-reductionist form of explanation that acquires explanatory
power by juxtaposing agents and institutions.
(iii) For Keynes, then, individuals both possess a subjective side that
exhibits shared human traits, and operate in social settings that distinguish
them from one another in terms of their separate courses of action. How do
these aspects of his thinking about individuals play into our conception of
the economy as non-ergodic? Davidson characterizes a non-ergodic economy
as one in which human action may transform basic cause-and-effect relationships, yet one in which individuals operate within and upon conventions and institutions . Relatedly, Lawson, in discussing the relationship
between human agency and social structure in an uncertain world, emphasizes that 'human agency and social structure each presuppose the other,
although neither can be reduced to the other, or identified with, or explained completely in terms of, it' (1995, p. 83). For both Davidson and
Lawson, it thus seems fair to say, individuals and institutions maintain a
relative autonomy which is central to our accounting for their reciprocal
effects on one other. My argument regarding Keynes 's thinking about individuals is that he places a similar emphasis on the relative autonomy of
individuals (and institutions) to explain uncertainty in the economy. In the
balance of the discussion in this section, then, I elaborate further on what
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relative autonomy implies, and how it operates in Keynes 's characterization
of individuals.
To further explain relative autonomy, it is best to contrast it with a stronger
type of relationship between individuals and institutions that one school of
post Keynesianism has recently advocated, namely, organic connection. The
characterization of Keynes as an organicist dates to Brown-Collier (1985)
and has more recently been defended in a 1995 collection of papers on
Keynes and uncertainty by Carabelli, Dow, Hillard, Rotheim and Winslow,
with Hillard asserting that it is ' now generally accepted among Post Keynesians
that Keynes denied the atomistic ontology of classical economics and adopted
an organicist mode of analysis' ( 1995, p. 257). Clearly post Keynesians agree
that Keynes did reject a classical atomist ontology of economic agents. The
passages above and their discussion indicate as much. But did he believe that
individuals and social structures were organically related - a philosophical
conception associated with the turn of the century ~ritish neoHegelian idealist thought of Bradley, Bosanquet and McTaggart, which Keynes 's philosophical mentors Moore and Russell explicitly rejected? And is this proposition
widely accepted among post Keynesians? Let us consider the nature of
organicist thinking and its implications.
Organicism, or organic connection, is an ontological thesis concerning the
nature of relations between things. Specifically, things are organically or
internally related if their very natures depend upon or may be reduced to their
relations to one another. More accurately, relations are real and exist, while
the things they relate, their relata, are aspects of relations. In contrast, external relations exist between things if the latter are not reducible to their
relations to other things. On this view, relations may be thought of as aspects
of the things they relate, but they may also be thought of as real phenomena
alongside real things, the latter sometimes distinguished as particulars
(Strawson, 1959). A view sometimes taken for organicism is holism, a multilevel whole-part form of analysis that focuses on principles that apply only to
the whole of some set of things, or are emergent at the level of the whole.
However, holist arguments are typically not organicist, as the idea of principles emergent at the level of the whole, as for example when we say human
thought is something over and above physico-chemical brain states, normally
precludes our reducing talk about parts to talk about the whole, or that we
translate our understanding of brain states into talk about human thought.
This difference between holist and organicist reasoning helps to isolate one
of the chief characteristics of the latter. Like atomist reasoning, though in
precisely the opposite sense, organicist views are reductionist. As things that
are internally related to one another are only aspects of the relations that
connect them , good organicist explanation is devoted to translating or reducing seemingly self-subsistent things into relata so as to explain the world as
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pure relation. Just as atomism has it that only individuals exist, the doctrine
of organicism is that only relations exist. In contrast, holist argument involves
a multi-level form of explanation . That human thought inheres in brain states,
but is at the same time so unlike them, helps account for thought as a distinct
principle over and above the collection of brain states which support it.
Human thought, that is, involves a distinctive principle of the whole, just
because it is closely associated with and also fundamentally different from
the physico-chemical processes which underlie it. Thus holist argument operates on two levels, neither of which is reducible to the other, and both of
which are required to explain the phenomenon in question.
A good case can be made for saying that Keynes used this holistic form of
reasoning in important ways in The General Theory . Consider the paradox of
savings as a multi-level explanation. The force of the paradox derives from
the fact that individual savings behaviour produces contrary movements in
aggregate savings. Thus two different concepts of savings are juxtaposed in
the analysis. Now organicists might claim that the proper meaning of savings
is that associated with the aggregate savings-income relationship, and that
the concept of individual savings is derivative and ultimately reducible in
some way to the aggregate notion. This claim does have a certain plausibility
to it, but only when we stress linguistic meanings and interpretation as the
appropriate level of analysis. Keynes, however, was not interested in debates
over the linguistic interpretation of savings. Rather he believed one could
isolate a real mechanism operating in the economy whereby increases in
individual savings produced decreases in aggregate savings. Moreover, the
mechanism he modelled depended upon individual and aggregate savings
being irreducibly distinct phenomena. His paradox had force, that is, just
because individuals could really do one thing, and something else really
happened in the aggregate.
A number of the proponents of the organicist interpretation of Keynes
represent organic connection as interdependence. Interdependence between
two things might be said to exist when each has effects on the other, which
then change the behaviour of each, so that they then have different effects on
one another, which then again changes the behaviour of each, and so on. If
we expand this picture to n number of things, it might be argued that the
system of interdependent effects becomes so complicated that we mayor
must ignore detailed connections, and simply focus on a principle that describes the whole process. In effect, the parts reduce to the whole, because
the parts have no real significance relative to the significance of the process
of the whole. Interdependence on such a view collapses into organic relation.
This is a perfectly coherent and reasonable argument in regard to some
processes. The question at hand , however, is whether Keynes employed it in
The General Theory. Did Keynes regard all interdependent processes as
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collapsing into organic ones? Hillard (1995) argues that Keynes showed the
flaws in classical economics when he demonstrated that investment and savings were (organically) interdependent via the latter's dependence on income.
Rotheim (1995) argues that Keynes 's entrepreneurs form expectations based
on social factors rather than just information internal to the firm, and that this
indicates the organically interdependent nature of the investment decision.
But note that in both cases what Keynes does is give a better explanation of
the mechanisms and the system of interdependence involved. Savings depend
on income. Entrepreneurs attend to conventions. In neither case does Keynes
reduce or translate concepts pertaining to the economy's parts into concepts
pertaining to the economy as a whole. Rather he explains the economy as a
whole specifically by exhibiting it as a particular system of interdependencies.
This is a holist, not organicist, form of argument, and to call it the latter
seems only to obscure the meaning of interdependence.
Returning, then, to the characterization of a non-ergodic economy offered
by Davidson and Lawson as a process of reciprocal effects between agents
and conventions, we need to ask whether this particular conception of interdependency ought to be taken as an example of organic connection. Clearly
what bothers proponents of the organicist interpretation the most is the notion
that the only alternative to their view is that Keynes held to a traditional
atomist methodology (e.g. Carabelli, 1995, p. 141; Hillard , 1995, p. 257).
Then, re-casting interdependence as organic connection, they conclude that
individuals cannot be understood atomistically, because on the organic view
things related are but aspects of the relations that involve them. But the
premise of this argument - that without organic connection individuals must
be conceived atomistically - is false, and not one entertained by Keynes.
As the discussion at the beginning of this section shows, in The General
Theory Keynes not only used an understanding of individuals different from
the one we find in neoclassical theory, but his conception has advantages over
the neoclassical one in the way he frames individuals' subjective side and in
the way he accounts for their social embedded ness. Indeed these strategies
permit him to avoid the problems neoclassical theory encounters in its view
of individuals as atomistic agents. Essentially, on Keynes 's view individuals
may be transformed in important respects according to change in the contexts
in which they operate. On the neoclassical understanding, on the other hand,
atomistic individuals are unchanging and uninfluenced in their basic nature
by the contexts in which they operate.
This difference is significant for an understanding of the economy as nonergodic. It means that we can analyse the historical evolution of the economy
in terms of series of reciprocal effects that individuals and conventions/
institutions have upon one another. In particular, policies aimed at conventions and institutions can be designed to change individuals' interaction in
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ways that improve social well-being. At the same time, that individuals have
effects on the way conventions and institutions operate tells us that policy
design always involves unintended consequences. Basically, then, our grasp
of the economy as an evolutionary process depends upon our grasping that
there are two distinct poles or levels involved in the economy : agency and
structure. Saying that the economy is non-ergodic means we need to trace
how these evolve together in terms of their mutual impacts upon one another.
On the other hand, saying that individuals and conventionslinstitutions are
organically connected removes from view the project of sorting out this
system of reciprocal effects.

KEYNESIAN UNCERTAINTY: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The project of explaining the economy as non-ergodic places thinking about
historical process in the foreground. But an historical process is susceptible
of analysis even when uncertainty and animal spirits are regularly observed.
The charge of nihilism advanced by Coddington (1982) only applies if we do
not have methods for explaining the state of uncertainty and animal spirits at
different historical junctures. Runde (1991) has shown that for Keynes the
impact of uncertainty varies according to different decision-making contexts,
and thus that uncertainty need not imply unstable beliefs. On the view here,
we may begin to understand variation in decision-making contexts and the
consequent state of uncertainty at different points in time in terms of the
evolution of interaction between individuals and the economic structures
within and upon which they operate. More attention on my part to Keynes's
thinking about expectations and the interaction between individuals and conventions appears in Davis (1994). Here attention is focused upon the nature
of individuals as relatively autonomous agents on account of the importance
of developing a post Keynesian analysis of agency.
Post Keynesians have emphasized the importance of conventions and institutions in the economy, but have given less attention to how to characterize
the activity of individuals within this framework. Davidson's treatment of
uncertainty in ontological terms suggests a way to develop this analysis . A
non-ergodic economy is one in which individuals possess a relative autonomy that is exhibited in the system of reciprocal effects individuals and
conventions/institutions have upon one another. To trace such a system of
reciprocal effects, both the influence of agents upon economic structure and
the reverse need to be explained. This chapter draws on Keynes to identify
elements of a theory of the nature of the individual for this purpose.
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